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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Olds Properties Corporation ("Olds") seeks
review of a final order of the Second Judicial District Court
for Davis County, denying Olds1 motion for temporary injunction
and granting respondent Unisys Corporation's motion to dismiss.
Unisys contests this court's jurisdiction over the
appeal because Olds has failed to file its notice of appeal
within the time provided by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 4 of the rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Unisys contests the statement of issues presented for
review contained in Olds1 brief.

Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Unisys submits the
following statement of issues presented for review.
1.

Was the appeal filed out of time or, in the

alternative, was this appeal taken from an order which was not
final?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

finding no irreparable harm?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

denying 01dsf motion for injunctive relief?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This action was brought by Olds seeking injunctive

relief.

Olds originally sought an injunction preventing Unisys

from "altering" a building in Davis County. (Verified Complaint
at page 7).

At a hearing, however, Olds limited relief it

sought to an injunction preventing Unisys from removing
equipment and improvements from the premises without prior
authorization from Olds.

(Tr. II at pp. 8, 9, and 17).

The

Second Judicial District Court in Davis County denied Olds1
motion for injunction and granted Unisys1 motion to dismiss.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below
This action was commenced on July 30, 1987 when

Appellant Olds Properties, Inc. filed a Verified Complaint
seeking injunctive relief in the Second Judicial District
Court, Davis County (R.I.1-93).

A temporary restraining order

was entered on July 30, 1987 (R.104-06), and was thereafter
extended by stipulation of the parties and further order of the
Court (R.I.109-11).

On August 21, 1987 Unisys moved to dismiss

the Complaint for Preliminary Injunction (R.I.112-195). A
hearing was held on August 24, 1987 on Olds' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

At the end of the day on August 24,

the parties again stipulated, subject to certain terms and
conditions placed in the record in open court, to the extension
of the temporary restraining order until further hearing could
be held on Olds Properties' Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(Tr. I, 59-64).

Another hearing was held on the Olds1

Preliminary Injunction Motion and Unisys' Motion to Dismiss the
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Complaint throughout the afternoon of September 28, 1987.

At

the conclusion of the September 28 hearing, the Court announced
its findings and stated that it had decided to deny the Motion
for Preliminary Injunction and to grant the Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint (Tr. II, 116-120).

Counsel for Unisys was

directed to prepare a Judgment reflecting these decisions.
There followed a period of negotiation between counsel for the
parties regarding both the form of order and the possibility of
settling the entire dispute which culminated in a jointly
agreed upon form of Judgment which was entered on December 21,
1987 (R.II.434-35).
On November 10, 1987, after the District Court
announced its decision at the September 28 hearing, but before
formal entry of Judgment, Unisys filed a Counterclaim for
declaratory relief.

Olds Properties responded by a Motion to

Dismiss which was granted by the court's "Ruling on Motion to
Dismiss dated February 10, 1988 (R.II.464-65), confirmed by
entry of a judgment dated March 17, 1988 (R.II. 473-74).
C.

Statement of Facts
In March, 1964, Deshon Properties Corp., ("Deshon"),

leased a building located in Davis County, Utah, to General
Motors Corporation.

In December,- 1972, General Motors

subleased for the building to Sperry Rand Corporation,
predecessor in interest to Unisys.
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When Sperry took possession

in 1972, the building was essentially a warehouse (Tr. I. pp.
14-15; Jan 1973 PHOTOS, R II page 416). Before the end of
1972, Sperry had converted the building to a manufacturing
facility by adding extensive partitioning, equipment and
machinery (Tr. I. pp. 15-16; March 1973 PHOTOS, R II page
415).

Through a series of transactions Olds eventually

acquired the interests of both Deshon and General Motors in
March, 1986.

In December, 1984, Unisys executed a document

styled Tenant Estoppel Certification and Attornment (the
"Attornment").

In 1986, Olds and Unisys entered a document

styled Lease Extension Agreement.

The interrelationship

between the lease, sublease, attornment and lease extension
define the rights and interests of Olds and Unisys.

Paragraph

10.02 of the 1964 lease provides:
It is understood and agreed that the Lessee,
from time to time during the term of this Lease
or any extension thereof, may install machinery,
equipment and fixtures of various kinds and
description for the purpose of carrying on its
business, and upon any of such machinery,
equipment and fixtures being so installed in or
placed on the leased premises by the Lessee the
same shall remain at all times the property of
the Lessee, and, at any time during the term or
any extension or extensions thereof and at the
termination of the Lease or any extension or
extensions thereof, the Lessee shall be entitled
to remove any and all of such machinery,
equipment and fixtures; provided, however, that
if any machinery and equipment is so attached to
any building or buildings so as not to be readily
removable without damage to the building or
buildings, then, in such event, if the Lessee
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shall remove the same, the Lessee shall promptly
repair and replace any damage caused to the
building or buildings by such removal. If the
Lessee shall exercise its right to renew this
Lease beyond the initial term for any extended
term or terms it shall not be necessary for the
Lessee to reserve its right to such machinery,
equipment and fixtures or their removal,
(emphasis added).
The 1972 sublease contains the following provision at
paragraph 17:
,f

This sublease is expressly made subject to all
the terms and conditions of said underlying lease
and the lessee agrees to use the premises in
accordance with the terms of the underlying
lease." Paragraph 20 and 21 of the sublease
provide as follows:
Repairs - The Lessee's expense shall keep the
premises including the grounds, buildings,
structures and improvements thereon in good order
and condition and shall make all repairs,
replacements and improvements required,
structural or otherwise. The Lessee will at the
expiration of this Lease, surrender and deliver
said premises with the building and aforesaid
improvements, appurtenances and equipment in
good order and condition, reasonable wear and
tear excepted. The Lessee agrees not to call
upon the Lessor at any time during the term of
this Lease to make any repairs or replacements of
any part of the premises or improvements thereon,
whether structural or otherwise, this being a Net
Lease. The intention being that the rent
received by the Lessor shall be free of any
expense in connection with the care, maintenance,
operation or repair of the premises or any
improvements thereon.
Alterations - That Lessee will not make any
alterations or add any construction whatsoever to
the premises without the prior written consent of
the Lessor, and in each instance, such request
for consent shall include a set of plans,
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specifications and cost of any contemplated
improvement, and if the Lessee makes any
alterations or adds any construction, such
additional construction or alterations shall be
removed at the expiration of the term and the
premises shall be restored at the sole expense
of the Lessee to the condition existing prior to
Lessee's taking possession, except for
improvements of the following nature which shall
remain on the premises at the time Lessee vacates
the premises:
(1) Any additions, expansions, or alterations to
restrooms.
(2) Changes in interior layout to produce a
cafeteria and lunchroom.
(3) Heating and air conditioning units installed
in the roof of the warehouse.
(4) Any column mounted power distribution
equipment or any main power feeds brought into
the building.
(5)

Any fencing done to the property,

(6) The Lessee may pave a portion of the
''expansion area," located on the north side of
the building. The Lessee must submit detailed
plans and specifications for this paving, and the
Lessor agrees to share in the cost of this paving
on a 50/50 basis with its share not to exceed
$8,000.00, payment to be made upon submission to
the Lessor of paid invoices along with lien
waivers from all subcontractors. (emphasis
added).
In 1986, after Olds acquired title to the building,
Olds negotiated a lease extension agreement with Unisys.

That

lease extension agreement specifically and narrowly amended the
language of paragraph 21 of the sublease as follows:
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Effective as of the 27th day of March, 1986
and in consideration of the premises and the
mutual covenants herein contained, the parties
agree to modify the terms and conditions of that
sublease as follows:
. . . 2. Clause TWENTY-FIRST, Paragraph 6, is
modified by adding the following sentence:
"In addition to the above described paving,
the 1983 parking expansion is excepted from
this clause TWENTY-FIRST."
The lease expires March 31, 1989.

In the latter part

of 1986, Unisys discontinued manufacturing activities at the
building.

In 1987, Unisys began removing certain equipment and

began restoration of the property to its original condition in
accordance with the terms of the lease.

Olds then filed its

complaint seeking to enjoin Unisys from removing machinery and
equipment or from restoring the building to its pre-lease
condition.
After argument regarding interpretation of the lease
provisions, and after an evidentiary hearing, the court below
entered findings.

The court found that Unisys' activities

constituted the type of restoration called for by paragraph 21
of the sublease.

The court further held that Olds had failed

to establish any irreparable harm from the conduct of Unisys,
and that to the extent Olds might be injured by Unisys1
conduct, any injury would be compensable through money damages
or by an appropriate action at law (Tr. II at pp. 115-120).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Olds advances three arguments on appeal.

First, Olds

argues the court erred by finding Olds could not waive the
restoration provision of the lease.

Second, Olds argues that

the court erred by excluding certain evidence regarding
"course-of-dealing."

Finally, Olds argues that the court has

misinterpreted the documents comprising the lease particularly
relating to the attornment agreement.
All of these arguments are founded on a faulty
premise.

Olds repeatedly represents in its brief that the

trial court found the kind of injury requisite to entry of
injunctive relief.

See Olds' brief at pgs. 2, 5 and 8.

brief misrepresents the record.

Olds1

The court below clearly held

that Olds had failed to establish any harm sufficient to
warrant injunctive relief.

(Tr. II at pp. 116-120).

The critical inquiry on this appeal is whether the
court below abused its discretion in finding no irreparable
harm.

The sole evidence presented by Olds relating to

irreparable injury had to do with damage to the concrete floor
of the warehouse.

The court below properly found that even if

Unisys caused damage to the floor, such damage would not
constitute waste, could readily be repaired by Unisys and would
in any event be compensable in money damages.
116-120).

(Tr. II at pp.

Based on the record before this court on appeal,
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ARGUMENT
I.

Olds' Appeal Is Not Timely, Or In The Alternative, Is
From An Order Which Was Not Final.
In its February 10 ruling on Olds1 Motion to Dismiss

the Unisys Counterclaim (R.II 464-65), the District Court
concluded "At the time the Counterclaim was filed there was no
action before the Court to counterclaim against."

This

conclusion is in turn based on the factual premise that "the
Court orally granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
plaintiff's Complaint on September 28, 1987."

If the District

Court's February 10 ruling is correct, it follows that Olds'
January 19, 1988 Notice of Appeal fails to comply with Rule
4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this appeal should
be dismissed for that reason.
In the alternative, respondent Unisys contends that
this appeal should be dismissed as premature because the Order
appealed from is not final within the scope and meaning of Rule
3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and is not, therefore,
appealable.
As indicated above, the Complaint for Preliminary
Injunction, the Motion to Dismiss that Complaint, and the
Unisys Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief all raise issues,
the resolution of which depends on the interpretation of the
same series of agreements pertaining to the same building in
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v. Marathon Steel, 692 P.2d 765 at 768 (Utah, 1984); Little
v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 at 919 (Utah, 1979).
Proper determination of whether the final judgment has
been rendered depends upon the facts of the particular case.
In this case, the facts show that the District Court had before
it in this action conflicting claims with respect to the
central question of which party owned the interior walls and
constructed improvements in the building at issue.

[Compare

provisions of pleadings - Complaint, 1117 (R.I. 6) with
Counterclaim, Us 18-19 and Us 1 and 2 of prayer for relief
(R.423-25).]

The parties sought differing relief based on

their conflicting positions with respect to that issue.

Olds

Properties sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting Unisys
from removing improvements which it claimed were its property.
Thus alerted to the Olds1 position, and recognizing the
potential for a claim for damages arising out of this same
issue, Unisys sought declaratory relief adjudicating that the
lease documents provided that it was the owner of the
improvements and could, therefore, remove them without legally
damaging Olds.
Where the parties seek varying forms of relief which
depend on the resolution of a single underlying claim (here the
ownership question), any judgment which disposes of some but
not all of the forms of relief requested is not final and not
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An injunction may be granted:
(1) When it appears by the pleadings on file
that a party is entitled to the relief demanded,
and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of some
act complained of, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(2) When it appears from the pleadings or by
affidavit that the commission or continuance of
some act during the litigation would produce
great or irreparable injury to the party seeking
injunctive relief;
(3) When it appears during the litigation that
either party is doing or threatens, or is about
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act in violation of the rights of another
party respecting the subject matter of the
action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual;
(4) In all other cases where an injunction would
be proper in equity.
Rule 65A(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 65A does not necessarily require a finding of
only one or more than one of these grounds.

Rather, "the

moving party must show sufficient of the foregoing grounds to
convince the trial court to exercise its discretion in favor of
entering the injunction/'

System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 425.

While other factors are relevant and important, a
showing of irreparable injury is crucial; "if the moving party
is unable to show that the commission or continuance of some
act during the litigation would produce great or irreparable
injury, the motion for injunction "will usually be denied,
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some

damage to the floor.

However, responding to a question from

the court, Mr. Rogers candidly admitted that such damage could
readily be repaired;
Q:

Is it possible to take those bolts out without

damaging the floor?
A:

No.

THE COURT:

Is it possible to repair the floor after

you take them out?
A:

The question he asked I answered "no."

question you ask, yes, itfs capable of repairing.

The

(Tr. II., p.

93, lines 11-17).
The issue was further clarified on cross examination
when Mr. Rogers stated that any structural damage to the
warehouse floor would have been caused when bolts were
installed in the floor.

(Tr. II at 105). Mr. Rogers then

testified that once bolts were removed, the concrete could be
repaired and walls could be re-installed in exactly the same
place;
Q:

Well, assuming that the concrete floor is

otherwise sound and uncracked, with the exception of the bottom
hole that went in and the bolt that came out and the patch that
was placed, assuming this floor as you observed is in sound
condition, how far away do you have to move before the concrete
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that

suffer,
Any damage

the defendant does to the building will not be of such a nature
that it can't be paid for in money damages.

(Tr. II 119, 120

(emphasis added)).
The entire premise of Olds1 brief is that the court
found irreparable injury.
that premise is faulty.

In light of the record, however,
As the court's findings are not

against the weight of evidence and are based on the record,
Olds cannot demonstrate any abuse of discretion.

The trial

court's ruling must, therefore, be affirmed.
Ill.

Olds1 Waiver Argument Raises A False Issue
Olds argues at length that it is free to waive the

restoration requirement of paragraph twenty-first of the
sublease.

The argument adds nothing to 01dsf appeal, however,

because Olds has presented no evidence that it did in fact
waive the restoration obligation.

Indeed, the evidence on this

point shows that Olds had not waived the restoration obligation
despite having been asked by Unisys to do so.

Olds devotes

fully one half of its argument to the issue of whether or not
it could waive restoration, but the only reference to whether
or not it actually waived is set forth on page 11 of Olds'
brief, where Olds disingenuously argues that by seeking an
injunction it "engaged in conduct consistent with its right to
waive."

(Olds' brief at 11). Nowhere else does Olds even

suggest that it waived the restoration requirement.
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had been waived--and this language proves just the opposite.
The fact that Olds might have waived the restoration
obligation--but did not in fact do so - contributes nothing to
proving that Olds was entitled to an injunction.
IV.

The Court Did Not Err In Excluding "Course of Dealing"
Evidence
Olds argues that the court erred in excluding "course

of dealing" evidence in support of its contention that Olds
could waive the restoration requirement.

(Olds brief at pgs.

13, 14). As demonstrated above, the question of whether Olds
could waive this provision is simply immaterial.

Even if this

court were to reach the technical evidentiary argument made by
Olds in its brief, however, exclusion of this evidence was not
error for at least two reasons.
best cumulative.

First, the evidence was at

The reason the evidence was offered,

according to Olds, was to "substantiate" the content of
exhibits P-6 and P-7.

(Olds brief at 14.

As the contents of

those letters were in evidence before the court, and speak for
themselves, it was not error to exclude additional evidence
offered merely to bolster that evidence.
Second, the evidence Olds sought to introduce was not
in reality regarding any "course of dealing".

The evidentiary

rulings challenged here by Olds appear at (Tr. II. pp. 55-63).
Those transcript pages are attached as Addendum C for the
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court's convenience.

The transcript shows that the two letters

were admitted without objection.

(Tr. II, p. 55, lines 407;

Tr. II, p. 61, line 19 thru p. 62, line 4 ) .

Olds' counsel then

tried to get the trial judge to let him use these letters as a
vehicle to allow Mr. LaGatta (president of Olds) to testify as
to what another person (Mr. Maguire - Unisys real estate
manager) believed about the proper interpretation of the lease
documents.

(Tr. II, p. 55, line 18 through p. 56, line 1; Tr.

II, p. 62 lines 13-19).

Olds' counsel then compounded his

evidentiary problems by trying to elicit the same unfounded and
self serving opinion regarding another person's understanding
and intent by asking about "negotiations" between Mr. LaGatta
and Mr. Maguire.

In addition to their insurmountable best

evidence and foundation problems, these questions were
immaterial.

The "negotiations" (if indeed any occurred outside

the exchange of letters received in evidence - a point not
established in the record) must necessarily have taken place in
1986 and 1987.

The "negotiations" concerned what the parties

might do to resolve their conflicting interpretations of the
1964 and 1972 lease documents.

As the trial judge correctly

noted, it defies reason for Olds to claim that the parties had
agreed on an interpretation of the lease documents (Tr. II., p.
59, line 13 thru p. 60, line 11). As the trial judge also
correctly observed, the real purpose of this line of questions
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was to try to allow Mr. LaGatta to make a speech about why the
lease documents should be interpreted as he wished them to be
interpreted.
The Court: What we are doing is spending a lot
of time -- counsel, of course, objected to the
defendant [sic] -- objected to this whole
proceeding because he was afraid of the very
thing we are now going into because we are trying
the merits of the case from the plaintiffs' point
of view as to why the court ought to interpret it
a certain way and all we are doing is telling the
Court what this persons believe the
interpretation is.
(Tr. II at 63).
As the profferred evidence was nothing more than Mr.
LaGratta's opinion as to what the lease documents meant, and
what he believed some individual at Unisys thought the lease
meant, there was no error in excluding cumulative evidence
directed toward an immaterial point.
V.

The Trial Court Did Not Commit Error in Interpreting
The Attornment Agreement
Old's final contention on appeal is that the court

improperly interpreted the effect of the attornment agreement.
This argument should be rejected because it is inconsistent
with what Olds argued to the trial court.

Early in the

evidentiary hearing, Unisys argued that para. 10.02 of the 1964
lease expressly said Unisys remained the owner of the equipment
and machinery which it had put in the building; and also
expressly provided that Unisys had the right to remove its
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equipment and machinery.

Unisys argued that the Attornment

provisions did not preclude para. 10.02 from controlling in
1986.

In response, counsel for Olds interrupted and told the

court:
Your honor, maybe I can cut this a little bit
short. As I said in my opening argument, we
don't care who owns the property. The operative
language of the lease that we are talking about
is all we want is written consent. . . . Now I
know I am out of order getting up and
interrupting Mr. Wangsgard, but I think we can
save the court some time. Who cares who owns the
property? We think we are right. They think
they are right. That's for a different day. . .
I think what we are talking about is a red
hearing.
(Tr. II at 24.
10-11).

This position also appears at Tr. II pp.

In short, Olds argued below that it should have the

relief it said it wanted because the attornment provision
didn't matter.

In this court, Olds says it should have the

relief it now wants because the attornment provision did matter.
More to the point, however, the interpretation of the
attornment advanced by Olds is simply not viable.

The lease

agreements, when read together, clearly vest title to
equipment, machinery, and fixtures in Unisys.

The Attornment

Agreement does not directly address nor indirectly affect that
ownership interest.
Paragraph 10.02 of the original Lease plainly and
clearly states that all equipment, fixtures, and machinery
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installed in the warehouse remained the property of the lessor,
and allocates a duty to the lessor to repair any damage to the
building which may be caused by removal of such fixtures and
equipment.

The clear intention of the provision is that the

lessee, over the more 20-year term of the lease, was entitled
to install and remove improvements, fixtures, machinery;
however, the provision also establishes an affirmative duty on
the tenant to repair any damage to the building occasioned by
installation or removal.

Thus the provision is in fact a

pro-landlord provision and must be incorporated into the
sublease even under the interpretation of the documents given
by Olds.
A more fundamental error arises in Olds'
interpretation of the Attornment Agreement, however.

The term

"attornment" is a legal term of art; "Attornment is an act or
agreement by which a tenant accepts one person in place of
another as its landlord.

It does not create a new tenancy,

but rather substitutes a new landlord subject to all the terms
and conditions of the original lease."

Ripples of Clearview,

Inc. v. Lehavre Associates, 443 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1981)(emphasis
added).

The attornment by definition cannot alter or amend the

underlying lease.

To the extent it purports to do so, no

consideration exists to support those amendments.
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Accordingly,

the attornment can do nothing more than substitute Olds as
landlord for the existing lease.
Even assuming arguendo that the Attornment Agreement
purports to do more than that, and that such provisions, if
understood, would be enforceable, the document is at best
ambiguous.

Under Utah law, if language of a writing is subject

to conflicting interpretation, an interpretation that will
bring about an equitable result is preferred over an
interpretation that will result in an inequitable or harsh
one.

First Security Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078

(Utah 1985).

Similarly, where one interpretation will lead to

a forfeiture, the court should ordinarily adapt an alternate
interpretation if possible.

See e.g. Wingetts, Inc. v.

Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah, 1972).

Green v. Palfreyman,

166 P.2d 215 (Utah, 1946).
The interpretation of the attornment proposed by Olds
would operate as a forfeiture.

By unclear and ambiguous

language which does not even address ownership of equipment,
machinery and fixtures, Olds argues the attornment agreement
deprives Unisys of its property rights and forfeits them to
Olds.

This is precisely the result sought to be avoided by the

rules of construction set forth above.

It also places Olds in

the position of seeking relief from this court which it told
the court below it was not seeking.
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The Attornment Agreement is not a model of clarity.
While it is difficult to discern what the provisions of the
Attornment Agreement mean, it is clear that the Attornment
adopts the 1972 sublease as the controlling document.

It is

clear from the provisions of the 1972 sublease, that the
original lease is subsumed by and incorporated into the terms
of the sublease.
follows:

The sublease at Paragraph 17 provides as

"This sublease is expressly made subject to all the

terms and conditions of said underlying lease and the lessee
agrees to use the premises in accordance with the terms of said
underlying lease.1'

Based on that provision of the sublease,

the original lease is part and parcel of the 1972 sublease and
accordingly is incorporated by the terms of the Attornment
Agreement.

This is precisely what the court below found.

(Tr.

II at 117, 118). This interpretation of the agreement gives
credence and effect to the substantive provisions of the lease
and sublease, without doing violence to the language of those
agreements, and without resulting in an unintended forfeiture
of property rights not even addressed by the Attornment
Agreement.
Finally, the court based its decision to deny the
injunction not only on the provisions of the 1964 prime lease,
but also on the provisions of the 1972 sublease.

The Court's

principle finding rejected Olds' interpretation of paragraph 21
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of the sublease.

The court held that paragraph 21 clearly

stated that Unisys had a duty to remove "additional alteration
and construction," and that no prior consent from Olds was
required.

(Tr. II at 117). Paragraph 12 of the Attornment

Agreement, on which Olds places great reliance, expressly
states that whatever effect its provisions may have, that
effect pertains only to the prime lease.

Lest any doubt exist

regarding the continued efficacy of paragraph 21, the 1986
lease amendment clearly adopts, ratifies and amends paragraph
21 two years after the date of the attornment.
89).

(R.I at 88,

In short, the Attornment Agreement, however construed,

would not reach one of the most important grounds relied on by
the trial court in denying the motion for preliminary
injunction.

Accordingly, the court's interpretation of the

Attornment Agreement was not in error, and must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
On this appeal Olds must demonstrate an abuse of
discretion by the trial court in denying Olds' Motion for
Injunctive Relief.
Olds has failed to do so.

No basis exists on the

record for reversal of the Court below.

The Court committed no

reversal error on evidentiary rulings raised on appeal,
properly interpreted the lease documents and properly found no
irreparable injury.
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DATED this 10th day of November, 1988.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Joel Momberger
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50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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SPERRY CORPORATION
WORLO HEAOOUART6RS
BLUE BELL PENNSYLVANIA 19424-0001
TELEPHONE (215) 542-4011

October 27, 1986

John H. 0, LaGatta
Olds & Co., Inc.
595 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Re:

Sperry Leased Facility
845 North Overland Drive
Worth Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. LaGatta:
Sorry for the delay in responding to your most recent
correspondence; however, I was waiting for legal counsel to
review our sublease agreement.
According to counsel, Sperry is obligated to complete the
restoration of the facility in accordance with the provisions
of the restoration paragraph unless you as landlord waive this
right. It is also their opinion that the restoration should be
completed by the end of the lease term, can be started at any
time, and landlord consent is not required. With regard to
landlord's right to waive, it is limited to waiving of the
entire clause.
Sperry is planning to move the current manufacturing operation
from this location to their main site in Salt Lake city. Plans
are to have the move completed by April, 1987. At the present
time we are evaluating the facility and trying to determine how
best to eliminate or substantially reduce our remaining rental
obligation. At the present time, Sperry is considering two
options: (1) Retain real estate brokerage firm and market the
property as an ongoing manufacturing facility. This, however,
will require landlord to waive Sperry's restoration obligations
and provide suitable leasing terms beyond the current Lease.
(2) Utilize the facility for remote storage or sublease as
storage space and commence restoration obligations in
accordance with ongoing needs of the facility.
In order to proceed with one or the other, it would be helpful
if you could establish your position on the restoration clause,
i.e., do you want Sperry to restore in accordance with the
provisions of that clause or are you willing to waive that
paragraph and accept all the improvements provided by Sperry.
If you are agreeable to the latter, it seems to me that we
could enter into an agreement with a real estate broker so that
they could market the property on a long term basis.
__
PLAINTIFF'S

ADDENDUM A

'

MH,mT
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With regard to your inquiry relative to properties Sperry might
consider a sale/leaseback, at the present time there are no
properties that are earmarked for a sale/leaseback. If any
become available*, however, it is unlikely that we would
consider your firm until we have a satisfactory resolution of
the North Salt Lake City facility.
Very truly yours,
-'.//

E. H. Maguire
Manager
Real Estate
EHM/kmm

ADDENDUM A
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Corporate Headquarters

UNISYS
February 10, 1987

John H. 0. LaGatta
Olds & Co., Inc.
595 Madison Avenue
New York, New York
Re:

10022

Building G - Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. LaGatta:
First, let m e thank you for your cooperation in trying to
secure Hercu les as a tenant; however, since it appears they
have chosen another building, I am planning to place the
property bac k on the market for subleasing. First, however, I
would like t o resolve the restoration issue. My understanding
of your posi tion is that you may require Unisys to restore
certain item s/areas and waive other ones. Unisys position is
that we are required to restore in accordance with the
provisions o f paragraph 21. Now that you have had time to
review the f acility first hand and see the numerous
improvements we have installed, I'm wondering if there is some
way you can agree to accept those improvements and waive our
restoration agreement.
We are currently in the process of relocating this operation to
our main site and plan to be totally out of the facility by the
end of June, 1987.
I await your comments.
Very truly yours,

Edward H.
Manager
Real Estate
/kmm
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PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
<7

And was that letter caused to be retrieved from you

Q

by your business records?
It .Indeed was.

A

MR. BLACK:

It's this one.

Move for its admission of Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 6
MR. WANGSGARD:
THE COURT:

No objection.

It may be admitted.
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 6, previously
marked for identification,
was received into evidence.)

Q

(By Mr. Black)

Calling your attention to the final

paragraph on 3Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, if I might give the
Court a copy <of that exhibit.
THE COURT:

I already have one,

It's part of the

things we were just talking aboutf isn't it?
one.

Here.

Keep that

I am using the one that is part of the affidavit of

Edward Maguire.
Q

(By Mr. Black)

Calling your attention to the final

paragra ph on the first page of that exhibit, did you have a
discussion or does the final paragraph of that exhibit refer
to the restoration clauses of the sublease that is Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 2 ?
MR. WANGSGARD:

I am going to have to object.. I may

not understand the question, but it seems to be a question
that th is par agraph of the exhibit speaks for itself.

qc;

THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

MR. BLACK:

I would like to read it into the record,

what it states, and then I will ask Mr. LaGatta what caused
t he conversation or the negotiations that are a topic of that
paragraph, if I might.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. BLACK:

"In order to proceed with one or the

other, it would be helpful if you could establish your
position on the restoration clause, i.e., do you want Sperry
to restore in accordance with the provisions of that clause or
are you willing to waive that paragraph and accept all the
improvements provided by Sperry.

If you are agreeable to the

latter, it seems to me that we could enter into an agreement
with a real estate broker so that they could market the
property on a long term basis."
MR. WANGSGARD:

I don't know where you are.

I don't

think you are in the exhibit.
MR. BLACK:

Q

Right there at the bottom.

MR. WANGSGARD:

Oh, okay.

(By Mr. Black)

That paragraph refers to a

restoration clause.

Wha„t restoration clause is it referring

to?
A

That would, of course, be the restoration clause in

the sublease which had become the lease because the other
lease, the prime lease, was made out of the exhibits.

56

MR. WANGSGARD:

1
2

THE COURT:

4

be stricken.

g

question asked.

Move the

based upon?

Sustain the objection.

The answer may

Proffering information and it's going beyond the

MR. BLACK:

I'm sorry.

I missed that.

Q

MR. WANGSGARD:

q

MR. BLACK:

10

Foundation.

answer be stricken.

3

rj

Objection.

What was your objection

I was thinking of —

I move the answer be stricken.

Ask if I could have his objection read,

if I might.

H

(Whereupon, Mr. Wangsgard's objection was read

12

by the Court Reporter.)

13

Q

(By Mr. Black)

And I call your attention to the

14

restoration language in Paragraph—the final paragraph of

15

Exhibit 7 that is before you.

16
17

MR. WANGSGARD:

are not talking about the final paragraph of Exhibit 7 and—

18
19
20

Counsel, first of all, I think you

MR. BLACK:

The final paragraph on the first page of

Exhibit 6.
Q

(By Mr. Black)

I call your attention to the

21

language referring to the restoration clause.

22

restoration clause, if you know, was being discussed in this

23

letter?

24
25

MR. WANGSGARD:
itself.

Objection.

What

The document s p e a k s

for

THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

MR. BLACK:

Your Honor, I submit the document

doesn't speak for itself because there can be many restoration
clauses and that document does not specifically refer to a
restoration clause.
MR. WANGSGARD:

But, this document has to speak for

itself because what he is purporting to do is to have
Mr. LaGatta tell the Court what another person intended when
they used those words in this letter.

That's why the letter

needs to speak for itself and we shouldn't have other
witnesses trying to explain what somebody else meant.
MR. BLACK:
Q

Why don't I rephrase the question.

(By Mr. Black)

Mr. LaGatta, had you previously had

discussions with Mr. Maguire regarding the restoration clause
referred to on the last paragraph of the first page of
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7?
A

Yes.

Q

And would you recount to the Court in general, the

terms of those discussions, if you can, date of the
discussions and where you had them with Mr. Maguire.
MR. WANGSGARD:

Just a second.

Objection.

Immaterial.
THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

We seem to be

now talking about what the negotiations are between the
parties; are we not?
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1

MR. BLACK:

Yes, we are, your Honor.

We are talking

2

about the negotiations of the parties subsequent to entering

3

into the contract regarding what the restoration clause meant

4

and for whose benefit it was for.

5

material but it's highly probative of what a reasonable

6

interpretation of Paragraph 21 of the sublease is concerned

7

with.

8

MR. WANGSGARD:

I submit that is not only

It's immaterial unless they are

9

going to claim that those negotiations amended the legal

10

binding documents*

11

unless they are claiming that they changed it.

12

make any difference.

13

MR. BLACK:

They can talk about what they mean all day
It doesn't

If I might answer that, your Honor. V7e

14

are using that to show interpretation placed upon that clause

15

by the parties.

16

and the definition of parole evidence if evidence prior or

17

contemporaneous with the transaction when it was entered into.

18

Now, we don't believe that is parole evidence

Now, the Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, on

19

numerous occasions, stated that when the parties arrived at a

20

construction or interpretation of the documents, that is the

21

construction interpretation that will be given the document

22

and I would be happy to cite cases on it.

23

THE COURT:

No.

You can't honestly tell me the

24

parties agreed on the construction of any paragraph in this

25

case, can you?

MR. BLACK:

1
2

there's additional correspondence.
THE COURT:

3
4

I think that we can because I think

Let me ask counsel.

you?

5

MR. WANGSGARD:

6

THE COURT:

7

I know he can't be speaking for him

MR. BLACK:

I think this shows that the parties had

an understanding of what the agreement was.

10

MR. WANGSGARD:

11

THE COURT:

12

He certainly is not, your Honor.

because I read the documents, too.

8
9

Q

It's just immaterial.

The Court will sustain the objection.

(By Mr. Black)

I hand you what has been marked as

13

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7.

14

document.
MR. WANGSGARD:

15
16

Would you please identify that

May I see what you are talking

about, please?
THE COURT:

17
18

Is he speaking for

What are you talking about so the Court

can refer to it?
MR. BLACK:

I will give the Court a copy in just a

21

THE COURT:

That's not what I already have?

22

MR. BLACK:

That's correct.

19
20

23

second.

Q

24

please.

25

A-

(By Mr. Black)

Yes.

Would you identify that document,

This is a Unisys—Mr. Maguire's letter of
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x

February 10, 1987 where he thanks me for cooperation with a

P

prospective tenant and talks at length about restoration and

3

me waiving restoration, et cetera.

4
g

Q

Now, was this correspondence based upon prior

conversations with Mr. Maguire?

6

A

It was in the series, yes, sir.

7 1

Q

Series of conversations.

And the last two lines of

3

the first paragraph refers to a waive of the restoration

9

agreement on behalf of Mr.—apparently, on behalf of Unisys.

10

Do

11

y ° u have any understanding of what was intended?
A

12

Well, yes.
MR. WANGSGARD:

Objection.

No foundation.

The

13

document, if we are going to do anything with the document, it

14

ought to come in.

15

to

16

document speaks for itself by putting documents in his hand,

17

identifying it and then trying to get the information in as if

18

it were evidence.

19

What is happening now is that he is trying

9 e t around the best evidence rule and the fact that the

The only way this information can come in as

20

evidence—I will stipulate to it 'for that purpose and the

21

document speaks for itself.

22

and I certainly object to it.

23
24
25

MR. BLACK:

Any other proceeding is improper

Apparently it has been stipulated to its

admission.
THE COURT:

Okay.

It may be admitted on

stipulation.
(Whereupon, Plaintiff1s
Exhibit No. 7, having
previously been marked for
identification, was
received into evidence.)
Q

(By Mr. Black)

Mr. LaGatta, you indicated you had a

series of conversations with Mr. Maguire involving
negotiations regarding the restoration clause of the sublease;
is that correct?
A

Restoration, maintenance and many other things.

Q

Had Mr, Maguire discussed previously with you the

waiver of restoration under the sublease?
A

Yes.

Q

And did he believe it was your right to waive

restoration under the sublease?
A

Yes.
MR. WANGSGARD:

Objection as to what Mr. Maguire

believed and move the answer be stricken.
THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

We will strike

the answer.
Q

(By Mr. Black)

Did he state to you that Olds

Properties could waive the restoration clause of the sublease?
MR. WANGSGARD:

Objection.

Immaterial.

THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

MR. BLACK:

Immaterial to whether they thought that

they could waive restoration?

That's the precise issue before

e:

1

the Court, your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

Just a minute.

It's not the precise

3

issue before the Court.

What we are doing is spending a lot

4

of time—counsel, of course, objected to the defendant--

5

objected to this whole proceeding because he was afraid of the

6

very thing that we are now going into because v/e are trying

7

the merits of the case from the plaintiff's point of view as

8

to why the Court ought to interpret it a certain way and all

9

we are doing is telling the Court what this persons believe

10

the interpretation is.

11

what the original transaction provided, you see.

12

real thing I have to decide.

13

line.

We are really not trying to decide
That is the

I will hold you to a very fine

It won't get away from us.

14

MR. BLACK:

I understand your concern, your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

And while we are having concern, I will

16

take a five-minute recess.

17
18

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
Q

(By Mr. Black)

Mr. LaGatta, I hand you what has

19

been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10.

20

identify that document.

Would you please

21J

A

Yes.

22

Q

Was that document retrieved from your business

23

I recognize it.

records as you previously described you maintain them?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Who is it from?

